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Introduction 
The French philosopher Gilbert Simondon was the first true philosopher of 
information, yet few outside of France know anything about him, let alone details 
of the informational ontology that he would construct. Born in Saint-Etienne on 
October 2, 1924, Simondon died suddenly in Palaiseau on February 7, 1989. 
According to a biography on the website organized in honor of her late father’s 
work, Nathalie Simondon writes that in his last years Simondon suffered from a 
“psychological distress” which caused him to prematurely end his career in the 
early 1980s. 1  More than anything else, this brief biography, written by the 
daughter of one of France’s greatest yet least well-known modern philosophers, 
conveys a feeling of tragic contingency, loss, and the notion that, hidden deep 
beneath the surface of piles of manuscripts and notes that he left behind, 
Simondon may yet have left us a few philosophical diamonds still waiting to be 
discovered. 2  The situation is even more unfortunate in that most of what 
Simondon did allow to be published has, as of this writing, yet to be translated 
into English. 3  Almost half a century ago now, Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) 
discovered what we are beginning to know today. Simondon is responsible for 
articulating “an entirely new philosophy.”4 What Deleuze did not point out, and 
what many English readers of Simondon have heretofore failed to pick up on, is 
that in articulating this new philosophy Simondon was simultaneously engaged in 
conversation with some of the most technically advanced scientists, engineers, 
and mathematicians of the twentieth century. Any real understanding of 
Simondon’s approach to individuation – most central of all Simondonian concepts 
– must acknowledge the privileged position that Simondon gave to notions from 
within engineering, physics, and especially cybernetics in his original ontology 
which, as this paper will show, remains a deeply informational one. 
So far, in France there have been two areas of research on Simondon; the first 
are works dedicated to the more political dimensions of his philosophy and the 
                                                          
1
 See Nathalie Simondon’s biography of her father at http://gilbert.simondon.fr/Bio/. The 
first part of this essay draws heavily from this online biography. Further references to it 
will be footnoted “Nathalie.” All translations of this and any work by Gilbert Simondon 
are my own. 
2
 One of the stated purposes of the site is to organize the publication of posthumous 
material. 
3
 There is one book, however it consists of material for some university courses he taught 
and does not cover any of the more significant work on communication and information. 
Gilbert Simondon, Two Lessons on Animal and Man, (Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 
2012). 
4
 Gilles Deleuze, “On Gilbert Simondon,” Desert Islands: and Other Texts, 1953-1974, 
(New York: Semiotext(e), 2004). 
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second include those that, rightfully, attempt to situate him within the history of 
metaphysics, and specifically the concept of individuation.5 What we have not 
seen, however, is an attempt to come to terms with the more technical nature of 
Simondon’s engagement with the sciences. Simondon was incredibly well-versed 
in fields that lay beyond the ken of most practicing philosophers. In a brief 
interview he conducted with the French magazine Esprit late in his life, he spoke 
about his philosophical approach, yet the interview is peppered with references to 
a diverse array of scientists, engineers, and inventors, including Albert Ducrocq, 
James Clerk Maxwell, Allen B. DuMont, Robert Stephenson, Michael Faraday, 
and others.6 It is a curious fact that we have yet to see anyone outside of France 
mention this area of Simondon’s work, just as we have yet to see a comprehensive 
account of Simondon’s engagement with cybernetics, perhaps the most important 
and least addressed aspect of his philosophy. A reading of Simondon must take 
into account his engagement with these fields, and appreciating his unique 
conception of the notion of information is essential for any understanding of 
individuation and the new branch of ontology that he helped to introduce. Indeed, 
Simondon’s name fits just as comfortably among names like Claude Shannon 
(1916–2001), Warren Weaver (1894–1978), and Norbert Wiener (1894–1964), 
just as it does Deleuze, Lyotard, and Latour. 
The following essay corrects something of this shortcoming by, first, situating 
Simondon in relation to the cyberneticist concept of information, broadly 
understood, and second, by analyzing the informational ontology that he helped to 
introduce. What I hope will become clear is the extent to which Simondon 
articulated a robust philosophy of information, one that resonates with 
contemporary approaches to this field, particularly by a new breed of philosophers 
who have made it their task to develop comprehensive philosophies of 
information and computation, such as Brian Cantwell Smith and Luciano Floridi.7  
The essay is divided into four sections. In the first section, I provide a 
biographical account of Simondon’s philosophical maturation in order to better 
situate him within the broader context of the French intellectual scene of post-
World War II Europe. In the second section, I draw on work from some of the 
                                                          
5
 Muriel Combes, Gilbert Simondon and the Philosophy of the Transindividual, 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012). Pascal Chabot, La philosophie de Simondon, (Paris: 
Librairie Philosophique Vrin, 2003). The former is an exegesis of Simondon’s politics, 
while the latter was the first attempt at situating him within the history of metaphysics. 
6
 Simondon. “Sauver l'objet technique. Entretien avec Gibert Simondon.” Esprit 76, no. 4 
(1983): 147-52. 
7
 Brian Cantwell Smith. On the Origin of Objects, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996). 
Luciano Floridi, The Philosophy of Information, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011). 
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American cyberneticists and related thinkers that Simondon heavily engaged, with 
the primary aim of dispelling the outmoded argument, brought up by some 
contemporary philosophers, that somehow Simondon remained diametrically 
opposed to the mathematical theory of communication. On the contrary, the 
American cyberneticists acknowledged right from the beginning what were the 
shortcomings of the engineering version of information, and Simondon picked up 
on these threads before setting out on his own philosophical approach. In the third 
section, I offer an exegesis of his informational ontology, along with my own 
comments on the philosophy of information. Lastly, I explain how Simondon’s 
unique contributions can be used to transform work in the field of 
communication. However, before unpacking Simondon’s informational ontology, 
it will be helpful to understand a little more about his background and the well-
heeled education that he received both in France and abroad that led him to a deep 
and prolonged engagement with what would become one of the twentieth 
century’s most talked about phenomena. 
 
Situating Simondon 
The philosopher is described by his daughter as having been always on the 
lookout for new opportunities for recording and reflection. He apparently kept 
notebooks and a large sketch book during all traveling events, whether at 
conferences, family holidays or simply journeying abroad.8 These notebooks were 
for sketching architecture and design material he would use in his academic 
teaching. He conducted experiments in the family home that would also find the 
fruits of their labor winding up as demonstrative lessons in the academy. But he 
was no shuttered academic; once in Paris he surrounded himself with the likes of 
such influential thinkers as Martial Guéroult, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean 
Hyppolite, Jean-Toussaint Desanti, Gusdorf Georges, Jean Laporte, Jean Wahl, 
and Jacques Lacan. He studied with Gaston Bachelard, specifically on polarity in 
psychology up to 1948, and seems to have maintained a life-long correspondence 
with him.9 Taking a graduate degree studying the Presocratics, Simondon also 
seems to have maintained an early interest in ancient philosophy, one that would 
remain as he situated his informational ontology in opposition to Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism. 10  Yet his interests remained far reaching. He was equally 
interested in physics (he had a certificate in mineralogy), and also psychology (he 
                                                          
8
 Nathalie. 
9
 Ibid.  
10
 For a more comprehensive analysis of Simondon’s relation to both Aristotle and 
Deleuze in terms of hylomorphism, see my “A New Individuation: Deleuze’s Simondon 
Connection.” 
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had a psychophysiology certificate, under the direction of Alfred Fessard), as well 
as zoology, mathematics, and the arts. He passed the agrégation de philosophie in 
1948 and was appointed to the Descartes School in Tours, where he taught from 
1948 to 1955. 11  In 1952, he studied for three months at the University of 
Minnesota, learning social psychology, and he participated in a seminar in 
experimental psychology with Paul Fraisse. The context in which Simondon 
produced his most important philosophical works is equally impressive.  His main 
thesis, L'individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information 
(Individuation in the Light of the Notions of Form and Information), directed by 
Jean Hyppolite, was finally defended in 1958, “before a jury of Jean Hyppolite, 
Raymond Aron, Georges Canguilhem, Paul Ricoeur and Paul Fraisse, and was 
also attended by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean Wahl, Pierre-Maxime Schuhl and 
Mikel Dufrenne.”12 His minor thesis (the French system required that candidates 
produce two theses), Du mode d'existence des objets techniques (On the Mode of 
Existence of Technical Objects), also defended in 1958, was directed under 
Georges Canguilhem. Both have yet to be published in English. 
Simondon was appointed Professor at the Sorbonne in 1963, and Professor 
and Chair of Psychology in 1965, where he became a colleague of Juliette Favez-
Boutonnier.13 He also spent time at the University of Paris V, where he taught 
general psychology, and founded the Laboratory of General Psychology and 
Technology from 1963 to 1983.14 He taught at the École Normale Supérieure, 
specifically at ENS Ulm Street, St. Cloud and Fontenay from 1968 to 1969, and 
he taught a course in social psychology and industrial psychology at the Faculty 
of Humanities of Lyon, as well as a course on the psychology of art at the 
Pedagogical Institute of Lyon from 1961 to 1963.15 He also worked and taught in 
Saint-Etienne (1961/1962), Nice (1969), and Lille (1970). From 1964 to 1970 he 
participated in a seminar on the history of science and technology led by Georges 
Canguilhem. 16  Finally, and perhaps most importantly from a world-historical 
perspective, he actively participated in the organization of the Sixth Symposium 
at Royaumont on the concept of information in contemporary science, which 
Norbert Wiener attended, in 1962.17 This conference would have a long-lasting 
and far-reaching effect on the French intellectual scene, as it was the first 
significant contact between American information scientists and their European 
                                                          
11
 Nathalie.  
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Nathalie. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid.  
17
 Ibid.  
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philosophical counterparts. The effects of this encounter would go through 
Simondon and eventually find their way to Deleuze, who then disseminated many 
cybernetic concepts in fields such as philosophy, literature, and the arts. It cannot 
be underestimated how much French philosophy owes to Simondon’s early 
encounter with cybernetics. Therefore, in the next section, I offer a short survey of 
the cyberneticist position, before diving into the radically new informational 
ontology that Simondon would derive from it. 
 
Cybernetics 
The American cyberneticists knew that there were areas yet unexplored by the 
concept of information as it was expressed in mathematics and engineering. 
Simondon knew this, and his approach to information was, in a way, an extension 
of these concerns. While he remained deeply critical of some of the cyberneticist 
approaches to information, he did not disagree with the engineering notion of 
information altogether. The mathematical theory of communication (MTC) 
continues to undergird all other forms of communication, including Simondon’s 
notion of information. What I argue is that Simondon’s approach to informational 
ontology is a type of extension of the mathematical theory of commutation, one 
that accounts for the indeterminacy of information’s interactive existence and that 
furthered the concerns of the earlier cyberneticists. Where the MTC notion of 
information is associated with a closed system of positive and negative types of 
feedback (the transmission model), Simondon approached information from a 
perspective that allowed for the interoperability of different types of information, 
leaving space for indeterminacy that would remain a fundamental component of 
Simondon’s open informational schema. These two factors – interoperability and 
indeterminacy – would allow him to apply the notion of information to fields 
beyond mathematics and engineering. But what does the mathematical theory of 
communication mean, and how did it set the groundwork for Simondon’s 
informational ontology? 
The idea that MTC undergirds other modes of information and 
communication techniques makes sense given the utility of its wartime origins. 
Developed in the Bell Labs in New York City during the Second World War, its 
inventor, Claude Shannon (1916–2001), was a brilliant young thinker who spent 
the better part of his academic life at MIT. His Master’s thesis on Boolean algebra 
and what he called a “logic machine” would lay the foundations for the design of 
computer circuits. One of Shannon’s often quoted passages is the following taken 
from his landmark paper, “The Mathematical Theory of Communication,” 
published in 1948 in the Bell System Technical Journal: 
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The fundamental problem of communication is that 
of reproducing at one point either exactly or 
approximately a message selected at another point. 
Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they 
refer to or are correlated according to some system 
with certain physical or conceptual entities. These 
semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to 
the engineering problem. The significant aspect is 
that the actual message is one selected from a set of 
possible messages. The system must be designed to 
operate for each possible selection, not just the one 
which will actually be chosen since this is unknown 
at the time of design.18 
 
This distinction between what we can call “data” and “semantic information” 
would be explicated by other cyberneticists and related thinkers, including 
Weaver, Wiener, Charles E. Osgood (1916–1991), and Wilbur Schramm (1907–
1987), each of whom believed that communication is, first and foremost, the flow 
of information.19 Clearly, the idea here is that the MTC approach does not have 
much to do with semantic information. Osgood and Wiener were equally as vocal 
about MTC’s inability to account for semantic information. The idea was not that 
MTC has nothing to do with semantics but rather that, while it might undergird 
semantics, it cannot account for it on its own. The absence of this important 
distinction acknowledged by cyberneticists is unfortunately reproduced in general 
discussions that feed the popular imagination of what information theory and 
cybernetics is all about, a practice that has been maintained with the appearance 
of documentaries like Adam Curtis’ All Watched Over by Machines of Loving 
Grace, a film that situates 1940s cybernetics, Thatcherism, and the Twentieth 
century’s general dissolution of the rights of living beings as part of one confused 
causal mess. While the film is admirable for the amount of information it shares 
about early communication theorists, the realities that it speaks to are a touch 
more subtle then what the 180 minute documentary is able to convey. A number 
of cybernetic texts can speak to the open place left within information theory that 
would later be taken up by Simondon. 
Osgood – an American psychologist close to the cybernetic circle who is most 
famous for developing the connotative meaning of concepts known as the 
“semantic differential” – acknowledged that there was a field beyond the strictly 
                                                          
18
 Claude Shannon, “The Mathematical Theory of Communication,” (Bell System 
Technical Journal, vol 27, 1948). 
19
 While only some of these thinkers used the “cybernetic” label, all of them examined 
cybernetic ideas and interacted with many of the field’s key thinkers. 
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data-theoretic terms developed in the area of mathematics such as “sending” and 
“receiving,” particularly in his description of “choice-parts,” that moment where 
the information-theoretic content of a message gives way to something not 
entirely predictable. This would be a theme throughout Osgood’s career, and it 
shares much in common with Simondon’s approach. Osgood saw communication 
sequences as informational in the MTC sense, but also as something that brings 
 
the communicator repeatedly to what may be called 
“choice-points”—points where the next skill 
sequence is not highly predictable from the 
objective communicative product itself. The 
dependence of “I'd better not wash the car” upon 
“looks like rain today,” the content, of the message, 
reflects determinants within the semantic system 
which effectively “load” the transitional 
probabilities at these choice-points.20 
 
Osgood would go on to describe a theory that lay beyond the “predicative” model, 
however, this remained strongly tied to the transmission model of communication. 
Like the other theorists of cybernetics, he theorized the way a semantic notion of 
information might be predicated on a strictly engineering perspective of 
communication, yet he reserved space for a non-connective realm. This sensitivity 
to contingency, lack of probability, and openness to the informational 
multimodality inherent to communicative processes are traits that Simondon felt 
were equally important. Indeed, he would take it one step further by introducing 
these features – which were up to then associated with semantic information only 
– to information in the “hard” sense, that is to say, information as an entity. To put 
it in terms of a helpful distinction made by Floridi, information can exist in three 
ways: information “as” reality, information “for” reality, and information “about” 
reality.21 Where the cyberneticists thought the interoperability and indeterminacy 
of information “about” and “for” reality, Simondon thought these concepts in 
terms of information “as” reality. Wiener, long unanimously declared the inventor 
of the cybernetic tradition, knew this more than anyone. 
Wiener saw communication as information just as Shannon did, yet where 
Shannon stated that he attempted to explain only an engineering approach to 
information and communication theory in his seminal paper of 1948, Wiener, like 
                                                          
20
 Charles Osgood, “The Nature and Measurement of Meaning,” (Psychological 
Bulletin, vol. 49. No. 3. May 1952).  
21
 Luciano Floridi, Information: A Very Short introduction, (London: Oxford University 
Press, 2011). 65. 
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Osgood and Simondon, admittedly sought to find the way that MTC information 
can lay the groundwork for a much more fluid and diverse conception of 
communication that develops from these connective underpinnings. The most 
interesting figure among the group (for reasons that I will not go into here), 
Wiener – who Bertrand Russell had once taught and described as thinking  
“himself God Almighty,” complaining that “there is a perpetual contest between 
him and me as to which is to do the teaching”22 – admitted that 
 
The desire to apply Cybernetics of semantics, as a 
discipline to control the loss of meaning from 
language, has already resulted in certain problems. 
It seems necessary to make some sort of distinction 
between information taken brutally and bluntly, and 
that sort of information on which we as human 
beings can act effectively or, mutatis mutandis, on 
which the machine can act effectively. In my 
opinion, the central distinction and difficulty here 
arises from the fact that it is not the quantity of 
information sent that is important for action, but 
rather the quantity of information which can 
penetrate into a communication and storage 
apparatus sufficiently to serve as the trigger for 
action.23 
 
Wiener developed an approach slightly different from that of MTC, one that 
admitted to a world where semantic information remained different from, yet still 
tied to, traditional notions of communication, where the data sent mattered less 
than the type of data that could penetrate into different communication systems. 
Different types of information mattered to the cyberneticists, as any careful 
reading of their work will show, and this little acknowledged fact flies in the face 
of contemporary, dehumanizing critiques of that tradition. Notice that penetration 
is not the same thing as transmission and implies the overcoming of some 
fundamental barrier. Contemporary debates on everything from cognitive science 
to epistemology remain deeply tied to the distinction this barrier introduces in 
terms of information, yet many, it would seem, are unable to account for the 
interplay between what Wiener calls “brutal” or “blunt” information and the  “sort 
of information on which we as human beings can act effectively.” Contemporary 
                                                          
22
 Flo Conway and Siegelman, Dark Hero of the Information Age: In Search of Norbert 
Wiener the Father of Cybernetics, (New York: Basic Books, 2006). 
23
 Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950). 
94. 
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philosophers such as Floridi are attempting a systematic philosophy that might 
define the interaction between these two levels of information and more. Indeed, 
the philosophy of information as a field is long overdue. While the contemporary 
approach to this field has begun by analyzing the texts of philosopher’s whose 
work relied heavily on the notion of information – perhaps most importantly the 
work of Fred Dretske (1932–2013)24 – Simondon remains a key figure that has 
yet to receive substantial attention. The next section will outline some of the more 
significant points in his philosophy of information, specifically Simondon’s 
informational ontology. 
 
Informational Ontology 
A little bit of demystification is in order. Simondon’s informational ontology, 
though exceedingly clear, has become obfuscated through individual 
philosopher’s appropriative attempts at an explanation of his position.25 Deleuze 
quizzically ignored many of the technical terms that Simondon inherited from the 
American cybernetic tradition – one would be hard-pressed to find any sustained 
engagement with concepts like “information” and “communication” in his work, 
save for in one of his last texts, the deceivingly short, brilliant “Postscript on the 
Societies of Control” – opting instead to retain only those terms in Simondon that 
imbue a decidedly more philosophical feel, for example, as in such terms as the 
“preindividual,” “ensemble,” and “dispartion.”26 Deleuze’s “rereading” (to put it 
mildly) of other philosophers is well-known, and the case is no different with 
Simondon. Simondon was no stranger to terms from fields outside of philosophy 
proper, and he frequently made use of them, including terms like “transduction,” 
“modulation,” and “information” (this last in an engineering sense). In what 
follows, I will attempt to minimize my own reflections on what I call the more 
“philosophical” terms associated with Simondon’s work and instead try to focus 
on those that are directly linked with the different fields that Simondon was 
drawing from. Additionally, most of the material that I will be quoting from in 
this section comes from the second half of his major thesis, which was published 
in France under the name L'individuation psychique et collective (Psychic and 
Collective Individuation) by Aubier in 1989. 
                                                          
24
 Fred Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981). 
25
 I do not think this is necessarily a bad thing in itself for the practice of philosophy. 
However, if one wishes to better grasp the concepts Simondon was working with in terms 
of their scientific significance there is a far more accurate and historically embedded 
story to be told. 
26
 Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” October, vol. 59 winter 1992. 
Iliadis / Informational Ontology
communication+1 Vol. 2 [2013], Iss. 1, Article 5
9
Simondon developed a unique approach to information that, while finding its 
origins in the MTC notion of communication, left an open space in the 
informational schema, allowing him to create a robust informational ontology. 
Some of the important distinctions between Simondon and the MTC approach are 
that, for the latter, information theory is one dimensional, is described in terms of 
probability, and aligned with the notion of entropy as taken from 
thermodynamics. In many ways, both are indebted to information’s spiritual 
godfather John von Neumann (1903–1957) who, shortly before his death, had 
prepared an unfinished manuscript for The Silliman Memorial Lectures Series at 
Yale. This manuscript, erudite and speculative in nature, compared many 
elements of the mathematical theory of communication (the computational model) 
with the human mind (the biological model). The manuscript was published 
posthumously under the title The Computer and the Brain in 1958 and the book’s 
importance, along with von Neumann’s influence, cannot be underestimated. 
Famously, the word “entropy” was suggested by von Neumann to Shannon to 
name the value of information embedded in a message. Simondon knew about 
these thermodynamic beginnings. In the MTC approach, he tells us, “information 
theory is the starting point of a body of research that founded the concept of 
negative entropy (or negentropy), showing that information corresponds to an 
inverse process of degradation and that, within the entire pattern, information is 
not definable in terms of the source, or the receiver, but from the relationship 
between source and receiver.”27  To understand how Simondon’s “alternative” 
informational ontology built on these entropic beginnings to eventually move 
away from MTC, there are a number of concepts that must be worked through, a 
task that is doubly important before the rich material of Simondon’s courses and 
conferences become available in English (they are infinitely more technical in 
nature). 28  The most essential of these concepts are (1) metastability, (2) 
individuation, (3) transduction, and (4) concretization. In what remains, I will 
provide an exegesis of these terms. 
Metastability signifies the first-order difference between Simondon’s notion 
of information and the MTC version. Where the cyberneticists saw information as 
a “thing” to be sent and received yet still reserved a place for semantics, they did 
not account for the way that these different fields of information interact. 
Simondon’s position is unique in that he viewed information as acting in a state of 
metastability, within a dual-dimensional and preindividual system, one whose 
nexus or pivoting point rested with the notions of information’s interoperability 
and indeterminacy. Rather than stop at information in terms of its probabilistic 
                                                          
27
 Gilbert Simondon, L'individuation psychique et collective, (Paris: Aubier, 2007). 50. 
28
 These are Cours sur la perception (1964–1965), Imagination et invention (1965–1966), 
and Communication et Information: Cours et Conférences. 
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transmissibility, he sought instead to think about the place where one type of 
information interacts with another in an event that produces a fundamental change 
in ontology. For example, he refers to information as being “never in a single 
homogonous reality,” but instead as existing in “two ordered states of 
disparation,” “disparation” here merely meaning the previous realms from which 
the new informational “entity” emerges. Information “either at the unit [MTC] or 
transindividual level is never deposited in a form that can be given,” […] but 
instead is the communication “between two disparate realities,” a “meaning that 
arises when an operation of individuation discovers that the two disparate yet real 
dimensions may be a system of information.”29 Information passes from a state of 
“metastability to stability;” it is “never a given thing” for Simondon. There is no 
“unity and identity of information, because information is not an end; it requires a 
system.”30  The amount of foresight that Simondon shows in this formulation 
borders on that of a clairvoyant. Before Marshal McLuhan, Simondon 
acknowledged the fact that information itself, as “data” or “message,” was not the 
whole story, and that the most important thing is the system where the 
information is constituted. Yet one must be clear here; Simondon acknowledged 
information’s multimodal character. Information could be “exchanged between 
beings already individuated” but also “within systems to come that produce a new 
individuation.”31 However, the bulk of Simondon’s work does focus on what one 
could call “internal information”—“one could say that the information is always 
internal, it should not be confused with information signals and media signals.”32 
“The notion of form must be replaced by that of information” is quickly 
becoming one of Simondon’s most well-known expressions.33 This brings us to 
the second important notion to understand and probably the most talked about 
term in Simondon’s philosophy—the notion of individuation. Individuation 
indicates that there is a state of stability and metastability, and it implies “the 
existence of a system in a state of equilibrium,” one that individuates entities; 
information in this system is “the difference in shape,” again “never a single 
term” but rather “the meaning that arises from a disparation.”34 Here, Simondon 
argues that the notion of information “should never be reduced to signals,” as in 
MTC, but that it must express the compatibility of two disparate realms.35 The 
MTC realm sees information as a “homogeneous line in which information is 
                                                          
29
 Gilbert Simondon, L'individuation psychique et collective, (Paris: Aubier, 2007). 22. 
30
 Ibid.  
31
 Ibid. 234. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Ibid. 28. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Ibid. 29. 
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transmitted with maximum safety,” indicating a closed channel, one that advances 
in signal strength as it avoids noise, and it is in this sense that “only content, not 
code, can be transmitted.”36 Content is the only thing that can be transmitted in 
the MTC model of communication; in the words of Shannon, it seeks to reproduce 
“at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point.” 
For Simondon, informational ontology, on the contrary, must be understood not in 
terms of informational content but in terms of informational code, understood as a 
tool for converting informational artifacts into something entirely new. 
Contemporary communication practices in “multimodality” and theories on 
object-oriented ontology speak to something of this concept, and are beginning to 
prove decisive in furthering our understanding of communicative processes. At 
bottom it is about a technique which expresses the many different ways it is 
possible to interface with an informational system. It is about a plurality of 
individuation, and not a subjective or singular one. Had he lived long enough to 
witness the flood of new approaches to information along with their attendant 
technological advances – big data, computational ontology, cloud storage – 
Simondon would have found solace in the fact that much of what he had to say on 
the interoperability and indeterminacy of information’s ontological significance 
came true. “Information is the formula of individuation” rings true today, finally 
putting to rest philosophical speculations on the separation between matter and 
form, subject and object.37  The most astute observer of this has been Bruno 
Latour, who describes Simondon as going beyond such simple distinctions, 
indicating in his own playful manner that for Simondon “subject and object – far 
from being at the beginning of reflection the two essential hooks to which it is 
appropriate to attach a hammock so that the philosopher will be able to sleep – are 
only rather late effects of the true story of the modes of existence.”38  
If individuation is the concept that Simondon deploys in order to overcome 
philosophy’s separation of matter and form – an ancient distinction that Simondon 
traces back to Aristotle – seeking instead to describe information as existing in a 
state of metastabilty, the name that Simondon gives to the actual action of 
“changing” of informational properties is transduction. In this third cybernetic 
term, form, for Simondon, “already draws on a theory of information.”39 What 
becomes important to describe is instead the process by which different 
informational properties interact among each other to produce something that is 
ontologically new. Transduction indicates the meeting of two disparate 
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informational realms and signals the beginning of the process of individuation. It 
points to the emergence of a new informational structure, one that resolves a 
disparity between fields, and these fields come together to actively produce the 
“potential that lives in matter.”40 One of his favorite examples is the air-cooled 
engine versus one that is water cooled. In the air-cooled engine, the informational 
properties in the air perform multiple functions, whereas the water in the second 
performs only one and acts as an addition. The air-cooled engine is open, in that 
the schematic design of the engine interacts with another “milieu” (as Simondon 
would put it). Transduction means that knowledge of the information inherent to 
interoperable elements of an open structure can produce real ontological effects. 
This example is admittedly more technological, but the priority of information 
even in biology should become clear upon closer inspection. For now, it suffices 
to say that transduction signifies domains of potentiality, these being the 
connection of information inherent to different systems, in a way that interfaces 
with other domains, unlocking and reconfiguring one another, once again calling 
to attention the notion of the multimodality of communicative information. For a 
more popular example, one merely has to think of apps and the way they 
reconfigure information to produce new ontological realities, for instance, as 
when GPS or other systems reproduce quantified aspects of reality in ways that 
elicit new affective experiences on the part of the user.  
There are, however, some philosophers who attempt to situate information as 
being opposed to energetic notions of reality, as if thermodynamic properties 
alone account for the materiality of the world. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. In fact, information signifies an a priori philosophy, perhaps a first 
philosophy, one that may work in tandem with energetics, as already evidenced 
by the highly informational character of the work that is done by many 
contemporary philosophers of science and physics.41 Floridi’s work is unmatched 
in this regard, and his “method of levels of abstraction” shares many affinities 
with Simondon’s philosophy of information. Like Floridi’s levels of abstraction, 
Simondon sought not to treat information as idealism or as an “absolute 
magnitude,” but instead materially, as “an exchange between parts of a system.”42 
The Simondonian schema necessitates the conservation of information and posits 
informational properties that, rather than acting as “bits” within a channel, 
fundamentally alter the system itself, producing a new ontological reality by 
reconfiguring two opposing realms in a way that resolves a contradiction. 
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Simondon’s philosophy of information retains this sense of dialectic. The 
relationship is not designed ideally as one “between preexisting terms, but as a 
plan of reciprocal information exchange and causation in a system […] the 
relationship exists physically.”43 It is both informational and material, producing 
informational structural realism. Here, one sees what Deleuze may have found 
most enticing in Simondon’s informational ontology. For Simondon, “information 
expresses the immanence of each of the subsets with the set.”44 However, this 
immanence does not imply homogeneity of information; information for 
Simondon remains fundamentally heterogeneous: “Information is not 
homogeneous with respect to its current structure, and there therefore remains in 
the individual a margin between the current structure and acquired information.”45 
Concretization describes the relationship of the metaphysics of information to 
the ontology of the technical object. This is where I situate most of my own work 
on Simondon. As is often the case with thinkers who deploy idiosyncratic use of 
terminology, Simondon’s concepts are typically misread and grouped into a 
combative category of thought to which I do not think they entirely belong. Many 
have tried to situate Simondon as completely opposed to the mathematical theory 
of communication to the extent that his theory bares absolutely no connection to 
those of Shannon and Wiener. This would be a mistake. While Simondon was 
often very critical of both Shannon and Wiener, I think it would be incorrect to 
situate him as being diametrically opposed. Rather, I believe that Simondon 
thought information as an entity in very much the same way as Shannon and 
Wiener; however, he described the entity that information is in terms of a 
different type of process. The difference is not that Simondon saw information as 
a “thing” differently from Shannon and Wiener, but that he envisioned it’s 
interoperability in a different sense. Like the buffoonish character Wayne in the 
1992 movie Wayne’s World, if I continuously close and open one eye and then the 
other (“Camera one, camera two! Camera one, camera two!”) it will produce each 
time a new effect where my affective ocular sensibility changes with each “click” 
(this back and forth of perspective is famously known as “parallax”). The objects 
in my visual field clearly do not change when I perform this activity, but 
something else certainly does, namely, the affect produced by each new percept. 
But does this mean that these two pairings of affect/percept are two distinct 
entities? Not at all. All that has changed is a mode of processing information. I 
understand Simondon’s relationship to the mathematical theory of communication 
in very much in the same way. Information is, of course, a real “thing” to be 
discussed and studied; environmentally, semantically, and physiologically. It can 
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even be viewed as being sent and received. The difference lies not in the “thing” 
but in its process, its interoperability, and its functionality. This is where I see 
Simondon contributing something that is unique to the philosophy of information 
and communication. And I will admit my bias. In the aforementioned parallax 
analogy, I view Simondon as having the one eye open. 
So how does the interoperability of information lead us to artifacts, to 
technological objects, and finally to theorizing technological genesis? I 
understand technology in terms of technique. If opening and closing my eyes is a 
technique, then it is a type of technology. But in this example there is no type of 
long-form genesis. How to explain the long-form genesis of technical objects? 
Here again Simondon proves eminently useful. His concept of concrétisation 
(“concretization,” though this is an unfortunate translation), I believe, is more 
useful than the concept of individuation in that it avoids humanist correlative 
attitudes and certain types of “soft metaphysics” that people are prone to engage 
in when dealing with highly generalizable, and historically messy, terms like 
individuation. But I will not digress into a meta-theoretical exercise on why 
occasionally the terminology associated with certain concepts deserves to be left 
behind. Concrétisation is not quite like the English transitive verb 
“concretization.” First of all, the English word is ugly. Second, and more 
importantly, concrétisation is an indefinite process that does not indicate a 
“transfer” as if something had gone from one state (abstract) to the next 
(physical), as concretization does. Concretization defines a specific result. It is 
used in the way that I can say, simplistically, that I have “given form to an idea” 
(the way that a group of advertisers might be told to make a brand more 
“concrete”). Concrétisation, on the other hand, describes a certain type of “pull;” 
it indicates what Simondon described as the “life” or “being” of the technological 
object. It is a notion popularized in books like Wired co-founder Kevin Kelly’s 
What Technology Wants. But it is not a type of emergentism like the kind Kelly 
argues for. The reason is that the “sum” of concrétisation is not greater than its 
parts; it does not connote something that at one point never existed. To put it 
simply, it’s concrétisation “all the way down.” Concrétisation is the engine that 
drives individuation. 
Even though I have just made the argument for the original French, for the 
sake of clarity, in what remains I will simply say “concretization” since I am no 
longer concerned with comparing the two, and the reader should understand 
“concretization” in the French sense outlined above. So, what are the inherent 
qualities of concretization? There are two. The first is that during the 
technological genesis that is concretization, the technological object tends toward 
self-sufficiency. You can cast aside all thoughts of “strong” artificial intelligence 
and mythological notions of conscious machines. All this means is that 
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concretization is not an additive process, and that the technological object tends to 
get smaller as it re-purposes elements within itself. When I say that concretization 
is not additive and that it becomes self-sufficient, this is due to Simondon’s 
second and more nuanced point, that technological objects re-purpose themselves 
by an interoperability that is achieved through the transduction of two regimes of 
information. What does this mean? If I have a technical object “AB”, and I want it 
to do something else, then I have to add “C” to it. This is not concretization but an 
additive process (think of the water-cooled engine). Concretization operates more 
along the lines of an algebraic equation, not in the direction of the “plugging in” 
of numbers that happens when we substitute variable functions with known 
quantities, but the reverse, when we reduce the equation down to its simplest, 
abstract form. In this sense, concretization is a rather counter-intuitive process. It 
does not tend toward the “real” or concrete “thing” so much as it does toward the 
essence of the technical object. Simondon provides countless examples and 
empirical evidence of just such a transcendental transductive principle throughout 
Du mode d’existence des objets techniques, moments in history where parts in the 
technological object become useful in more ways than one, re-purposed, or 
achieve a higher state of interoperability, and as a result help to move the 
technological object along in its concretization toward a more abstract state of 
being. But it should not be forgotten, and people do not talk about this nearly 
enough, that information plays a fundamental role in this concretization. If 
concretization is the engine that drives individuation, then information is the gas 
that keeps concretization working. 
Informational ontology, then, sees all things as real, yet it acknowledges along 
with Simondon that information is the methodological skeleton key that allows us 
to inquire into the “objects” and “materiality” in the first place. As Floridi so 
eloquently puts it, we are decades into our “fourth revolution” after Copernicus, 
Darwin, and Freud. 46  At this late stage in the game, we need to keep this 
philosophical car running and not turn back for lack of historical or philosophical 
hindsight. Alan Turing, long held up by mathematicians and computer scientists, 
deserves to enter the pantheon of continental heritage and create some ripples in 
this too often isolationist pond. Simondon, while clearly at odds with much of the 
mathematical theory of communication and its practitioners, did not denounce 
them entirely. He engaged much of Turing, and the extent of Deleuze’s 
engagement with Simondon was no tiny event, as we are all beginning to see. To 
end with a cliché, it does not take a special type of genius to see that 1 + 2 = 3.  
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For my conclusion, I will briefly explain what I believe a return to Simondon 
– and specifically an informational ontology – can contribute to the field of 
communication. 
 
Communication and New Materialism 
How might Simondon’s unique contributions be used to transform work in the 
field of communication? What does it all mean? It would be much more effective 
to explicate the significance of Simondon’s work and to describe exactly what 
conceptual or methodological advantage there is in situating him as a philosopher 
of information for communication. What is there to recommend his work? 
The way I see it, Simondon is useful to the study of communication for four 
reasons, although they can be grouped under the general observation that 
communication as a discipline has yet to “find” a philosophy that it can call its 
own. We have yet to find a work that outlines communication’s metatheoretical 
positionality in toto. This is barring, of course, work on this subject in two by-
now classic texts, Robert T. Craig’s excellent “Communication Theory as a Field” 
(1999) and John Durham Peters’ insightful “Genealogical Notes on ‘The Field’” 
(1993). Consider that many other “fields” have canonical philosophical texts that 
outline something of their theoretical heritage. Communication must find a 
philosophy that speaks to the multimodality of three things—information, 
communication, and technology, and that answers the philosophical question 
“What is communication?” I believe Simondon provides us with an answer to this 
question, for it is not enough to accept the sorry conclusion, so often reached in 
these metatheoretical exercises, that communication is an “interdisciplinary” mix 
of this and that, or, worse, that it is by virtue of being an academic potpourri that 
communication finds meaning. Such conclusions are conceptually lazy. Simondon 
offers us the conceptual tools with which to parse through this field in a properly 
analytical and philosophical way that can enable future scholars of 
communication a way forward, while providing a useful reference point.  
A return to Simondon specifically provides communication with the 
following. First, Simondon offers us a new methodology from which to conduct 
inquiries related to communication as an empirical endeavor. An individuative 
methodology would seek to proceed by articulating instances of the modulation of 
communicative processes themselves, rather than in the simple “transmission” of 
meaning or data between pre-given, already individuated entities. For example, 
whether we are talking about empirical evidence in doctor-patient health 
communication or the analysis of vast quantities of data in social network 
analysis, an individuative methodology would seek to measure, uncover or 
understand those communicative structures that modulate in the act of 
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communication and that perpetuate by virtue of an individuative flexibility. What 
variable characteristics of the formal “consultation” setting are responsible for 
trends that develop in interpersonal communication? How do reflective properties 
inherent in the visibility of a wiki edit history potentially alter future edits? These 
are the structural qualities of modulation that an individuative methodology would 
seek to uncover. Second, Simondon offers us a new conceptual toolbox and 
specialized terminology with which to frame our future discussions on entirely 
new communicative phenomena: the language of technics. Instances of 
modification in the technical evolution of objects such as engines, programs, and 
games can be referred to as points of “concretization” when we intend to say 
something like “technological evolution.” Moments where once-separate levels of 
communicative or informational properties are linked and give way to something 
new can be referred to as acts of “disparation,” and so on (Simondon uses the 
example of left and right retinal imaging). Third, Simondon allows us to bypass a 
longstanding philosophical debate; however, it is one that affects the future of 
communication studies also. A Simondonian informational ontology allows us to 
finally put aside the subject-object deadlock and instead consider the human that 
is present in the technological object, and vice versa, as an ensemble. 
Communication research into interfaces and human-computer interaction stand to 
benefit from Simondon’s deeply phenomenological approach to technology and 
embodied interaction, where the point is less about the separation of the human 
from the technical than it is about the successful interoperability of the ensemble. 
Fourth, Simondon shifts the discussion from paradigms of closed ecologies to 
wide-open informational paradigms. Though this might sound speculative, I 
believe Simondon’s informational ontology stands with some of the most rigorous 
philosophies of informational structural realism that currently exist, and thus that 
it can inform communication not by proffering predetermined boundaries of 
inquiry as in ecology, but by recommending an open informational realism that is 
amenable to the most radically inquisitive forms of research, such as in 
multimodality (Simondon’s concept of “transindividuality” expresses something 
of this). But there is much more than this to recommend in Simondon.   
 For all of the above stated reasons (and many more), Simondon is 
uniquely situated to add significantly to communication (and philosophy) once 
again. Although tragically cut short, his career and the body of work that it 
produced stands as a veritable treasure chest of philosophical diamonds still 
waiting to be discovered. In the same way that Ian Hacking found inspiration in 
Foucault, producing some of his best work after the French philosopher had died, 
or in the way that still countless others found inspiration in Deleuze, when I think 
of Simondon it is with the hope that, vicariously, he too will one day enjoy in the 
afterlife the career he was so close to obtaining in this one.  
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